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CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES
UNDER UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
JOHN H. CRABB*
Of especial significance to the American importer is the question of
classification of his merchandise by the customs officials. This classification
will determine the rate and amount of duty applicable on the importation.
The amount of duty assessed may determine the whole matter of profit
or loss on the entire business transaction which is the subject of the
importation. The tariff statutes seek to be specific on the matter of
classification of imports. but in order to cover completely the limitless
variety of items that find their way into world commerce, the statutes
necessarily have relied widely on class designations. However, these class
designations themselves arc highly specific, and this creates as well as
eliminates problems. It results in competing or closely similar paragraphs,
with considerable latitude for interpretation in determining which of two
or more paragraphs properly applies to a given set of facts.
The classifications given in the tariff schedule appear to be amazingly
complex and arbitrary at first glance. But it is to be remembered that
protectionism is the basic motive behind the American tariff, and the
schedule as devised is not arbitrary or absurd, but reflects the specific
products and concerns of American industries that Congress determined
should be protected. The schedule is a result of hearings at which vast
detailed amounts of technical industrial information was submitted to
the government. This information is gathered continuously through the
years, and the experiences and provisions of prior tariff schedules are drawn
upon also in devising new tariffs. The reported cases on classification
tend to be concerned largely with partly manufactured or processed articles
designed for use as parts in completed consumer goods which are assembled
by American industry. The high degree of specificity of such articles and
their endless and changing variety appear to be the primary causes of
classification problems.
I.
Tariff laws and procedures are firmly grounded on unquestioned
constitutional foundations. Thc power to regulate foreign commerce is
expressly accorded to Congress in the Constitution.' It is a well-settled
principle that while Congress cannot delegate its legislative functions, it
may provide administrative machinery with authority and discretion neces-
sary to apply enacted legislation. There has never been a serious question
*A.B., 1944, University of Michigan; LLB, 1948, Harvard University; Member of
Michigan and Detroit Bar Ass'ns.
1. U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8.
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as to the propriety of the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury
as the chief executive officer responsible for the administration of the
tariff. 2 This is despite the breadth of the statutory language which directs
him to promulgate rules and regulations "not inconsistent with the law."
3
The tariff acts have never succumbed to an attack that the guides for
administrative action ace insufficient, probably because the nature of the
legislation is such that the breadth of the authority granted was necessary.4
Congress must be permitted to make effective its authority to regulate
foreign commerce. Such authority of the collector and other customs
officials as is not expressly set forth in the statute descends from the
Secretary of the Treasury through such regulations as he may promulgate.5
Customs matters have their own special remedial procedures. After
the collector has all the information at his disposal concerning an importa-
tion, he makes a determination of the duty owed, his decision beiug known
as a "liquidation." This liquidation becomes final and binding on all
parties, including the government, after sixty days, unless a protest is
made to the collector within that period. In such event, the collector
re-examines his original liquidation, and makes a "reliquidation" within
ninety days of the date of the protest. Any party dissatisfied by the
reliquidation may within sixty days file a reprotest with the collector, in
which case the collector turns the matter over to the customs court.
Despite its name, the customs court is not a court, but an administrative
tribunal, and was known until 1926 as the Board of General Appraisers;
it is however, an independent tribunal, not subject to the authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury 7 Appeal from decisions of the customs court
lies within sixty days8 to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals," the
point at which customs matters first enter the judicial system. From
this court, appeal lies to the Supreme Court in the usual manner by
certiorari. These procedures are specifically provided for in the tariff
act. 0 This system evolved to its present form gradually as the procedural
needs developed through experience, the original remedy for customs actions
having been until 1864 a common law suit against the collector.
Thus the importer has at his disposal all the traditional judicial
safeguards against wrongful or arbitrary administrative action. The present
procedural machinery for customs litigation appears to be highly satis-
2. 1. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
3. 46 STAT. 731 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1502 (a) (1952).
4. Passavant v. United States, 184 U.S. 214 (1893).
5. 46 STAT. 731 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1502 (c) (1952).
6. A brief summary and history of customs litigation procedures is given by Erwin
N. Griswold in The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Hxitv. L. REv. 1174 - 1176
(1937).
7. Nicholas v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1916).
8. Ninety days in cases of appeals from territories or possessions.
9. In 1929 the Court of Customs Appeals was merged -with the Court of Patents
Appeals forming the present Court of Customs and Patents Appeals.
10. 46 STAT. 734 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1514 et seq. (1952).
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factory, and it is rare that a customs case finds its way to the Supreme
Court.
Though the collector is at the bottom of this hierarchy of tribunals,
he nevertheless may well be the most important level for the average
importer as a practical matter. If an importer feels aggrieved by a
liquidation, it may be very costly for him to pursue his remedies. If he
wishes to withdraw the merchandise while litigation is in progress, as would
often be the case, he must post bond for the full amount of the duty
assessed and may thereby incur large financing costs if the sum involved is
a large one. In cases where the amount in dispute would not warrant
the costs of litigation, the collector becomes in effect the final arbiter of
the question. In all the customs apparatus the collector may be regarded
as the most crucial factor to an effective functioning of the tariff system.
Of course, the considerations discussed in the preceding paragraph
are common in principle to most legislation. With at least approximate
correctness it may be said that a law is neither good nor bad but administra-
tion makes it so. In the first instance the effective functioning of any law
depends upon the competence and integrity of the officials to whom its
original application is entrusted. Perhaps less reliance is placed on this
in administrative than in judicial matters, but the principle is of highest
importance in both fields due to the costliness of correction of errors
and implementation of the safeguards provided. In this regard the United
States customs organization enjoys an enviable reputation.
With particular regard to classification, the collector's practical authority
is buttressed by the forces of inertia which rally to the support of his
liquidation. The burden of overcoming the correctness of the collector's
classification is on the importer,' and the courts consistently indulge
in every presumption in favor of his classification. 12  On this principle
are grounded most of the decisions in classification cases. Often the
language of the court is such as to suggest that it would have been just
as satisfied had the original classification been made as urged by the
importer, but decide against him because there is not such clear and
inherent superiority of his classification as would overcome the presumption
in favor of the collector. The collector cannot reclassify after the liquidation
has become final, except in cases of fraud. It is proper for the collector
to reliquidate on well-grounded suspicion of fraud,' 3 but of course his
finding of fraud is not conclusive. 4 In order to sustain such reliquidation
the government must prove the fraud.16
11. Henry Pollak, Inc. v. United States, 19 C.C.P.A. 215 (1913); V. J. Lake & Co.
v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. 247 (1939)
12. Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Cust. App. 218 (1927);
Greenberg & Josefsberg v. United States, 28 C.C.P.A. 138 (1940); Wo Kee & Co. v.
United States, 28 C.C.P.A. 280 (1941).
13. Vitelli & Son v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 743 (1914).
14. United States v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 211 Fed. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
15. Zucca v. United States, 10 Ct. Cust. App. 133 (1920).
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IT.
Several rules for classification have evolved. However, these might
best be described as "rules of thumb," and the reported cases show that
in many instances these rules are not easy or obvious of application to
specific facts. Moreover, these rules develop refinements and conflicts of
priority which greatly increase the complexity of the problem.
The sovereign principle for the interpretation of any document is
the intent of its makers, as may be gleaned from a study of the contents
of the document itself. When this principle is applied to legislation such
as the tariff acts, the primary concern of the courts must be the expressed
intent of Congress. As an aid to determining congressional intent with
respect to classification under the tariff acts, the rule of relative specificity
is frequently resorted to by the courts.' 0  Subject to other overriding
expression of legislative intent, 17 merchandise shall be dutiable under the
paragraph of the schedule that most closely describes it.
There is 11o quarrel with this very sound and logical principle, but
it is far from simple to apply. For example, an eo normine designation
presumably is the highest degree of specificity, so that an import which is
an article expressly named in the statute supposedly presents very little in
the way of a classification problem. But the case of United States v.
Salomon & Bro.,' 8 shows how illusory such an assurance can be. The
merchandise there in question was Fuller's earth, chemically processed
with acids. The Tariff Act of 1930 provided one rate on "Fuller's earth,
. . .wrought or manufactured," and a higher rate on "clays or earths
artificially activated with acid or other material."' 9 At first blush it might
seem apparent that the first part of the paragraph is more specifically
applicable. Yet the collector held otherwise and the court sustained
him. The court considered the legislative history of the act and reviewed
committee hearings, where it appeared that at the time of passage of
the act Congress considered that it was not possible to activate Fuller's
earth with acid, and this technological development occurred subsequently.
On this basis the court inferred a legislative intent to assess all acidly
activated clays and earths at a particular rate, and if Fuller's earth later
were to become so treated, it would fall in that class rather than its
eo nomine designation. The words "wrought or manufactured" would
not apply to acid processing of Fuller's earth in view of the legislative
history and intent as found by the court. Despite the seeming paradox,
16. P. Biersdorf & Co. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. 158 (1944); Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. United States. 31 C.C.P.A. 56 (1943); United States v. Eimer & Amend,
28 C.C.P.A. 10 (1940); Middleton v. United States, 28 C.G.P.A. 214 (1940); United
States v. William Cooper & Nephews, 22 C.C.P.A. 31 (1931).
17. Adolphe Hurst & Co. v. United States, 33 C.CP.A. 96 (1946); United States
v. E. DeGrandmont, Inc., 21 C.C.P.A. 17 (1933); United States v. Clay Adams Co.,
20 C.C.P.A. 285 (1932).
18. 22 C.C.P.A. 490 (1934).
19. 64 STAT. 1075 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1001, Par. 207 (1952).
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the court's decision cannot be said to be unsound, especially when the
presumption in favor of the collector's classification is brought to bear.
The rule of relative specificity has also yielded to an interpretation
that legislative intent gives highest priority for classification purposes to
the use for which the import is designed. This is in keeping with the
recognized motive of the statute to protect American industry against
foreign competition. The draftsmanship of the statute follows a practice
of providing rates for a list of specifically described or eo nomine designations,
and concluding with a rate for all items of the same type and class not
specially provided for. The question of relative specificity is often whether
the import conforms with the specific designations or falls into the
general residue class designation. In the case of Julius Forstmann & Co. v.
United States,20 the import involved was textile machinery having as
essential features electric motors and devices. As it did not fit any
specific textile machinery in the schedule, the collector classified it under
"all other textile machinery, finished or unfinished, not specially provided
for."2' The importer claimed the proper classification to be under "articles
having as an essential feature an electric element or device, such as electric
motors, fans, (etc.). '"22 In upholding the collector the court said that
legislative intent (protection) showed that it was desired to have classifica-
tion by use to prevail over general or even eo nomine classifications. Thus
if the import fell under a use designation anywhere in the tariff, even a
residue class, this designation would prevail over a more exact designation
elsewhere unconcerned with use.
On the other hand, this priority of use doctrine does not apply
unless the article at time of importation has been fully dedicated for all
practical purposes to a particular use, even though the importer's actual
intended use of it may be apparent. In Worthington v. Robbins,3 the
importer was a watchmaker, and be was importing "hard white enamel"
to be used in making watch dials. Evidence showed that the article
could be put to many other industrial uses besides, and would have to
undergo further processing before being used for dials. The collector was
held in error for classifying it as watch material rather than as an article
"manufactured in whole or in part, not herein enumerated or provided for."
In laying the rule of relative specificity against the matrix of legislative
intent, the courts have also given effect to the motive of protection of
domestic labor. The more advanced the stage of manufacture and
processing the merchandise presented for import is in, the greater the rate
of duty intended will be presumed.2 4 Thus, in determining between two
20. 28 C.C.P.A. 222 (1940).
21. 64 STAT. 4 (1930), 19 U.S.C. 1001, Par. 372 (1952).
22. 48 StAT. 944 (1934), 19 U.S.C. 4 1353 (1952).
23. 139 U.S. 337 (1891).
24. United States v. 0. M. Baxter, Inc., 16 Ct. Cust. App. 257 (1928); United
States v. Field & Co., 15 Ct. Cust. App. 254 (1927).
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competing paragraphs, the court may go into the matter of the extent of
additional processing or manufacture the merchandise will undergo in this
country before reaching the consumer market.
25
In the event the rule of specificity fails to determine a classification
issue, the statute ungenerously provides:
... If two or more rates of duty shall be applicable to any imported
article, it shall be subject to duty at the highest of such rates.26
Obviously this provision begs the question of relative specificity, and
the factual and interpretative investigation necessary to determine that
issue must be made before this rule of the highest rate can be applied.
For example, it has been held in a case involving lace handkerchiefs that
a designation of articles composed of lace is the same as a designation of
articles from which threads have been omitted, drawn, punched, or cut
out, with threads reintroduced after weaving, and the designation providing
the higher duty was the correct one,27 The lengthier description merely
itemized the process of making lace and hence was no more specific than
the word "lace" itself. Doubt has been raised whether this highest rate
rule applies when under one competing paragraph the import would be
free and would be dutiable under the other 28 ; or where under one paragraph
the duty would be ad valorem and under the other specific.aa The weight
of the authority seems to be that these distinctions do not affect the
applicability of the provision.
The phrase "not specially provided for," of common recurrence in
the statutes, has received some particular attention with regard to the
issue of classification. It has been held not to lessen the specificity of
the other provisions of the paragraph to which it is appended.30 On the
other hand, if two competing paragraphs are equally specific in all other
respects, and one has this phrase appended to it and the other does not,
the paragraph not containing the phrase will be deemed the more specific
and will govern. The reason for this is that the inclusion of this phrase
advises the collector that the designation may be otherwise provided for,
25. "Lines enumerated between different articles in tho tariff are sometimes very
nicely drawn, and a trifling amount of labor is often sufficient to change the nature of the
article and determine its classification." Saltonstall v. Wiebusch, 15 Sup. Ct. 476
(1895); see also United States v. Bayersdorfer & Co., 12 Ct. Cust. App. 377 (1924).
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1001, Par. 1559 (1952); this seems to answer earlier cases to the
effect that cases of doubt .should be resolved in favor of the importer, as any intent of
Congress to impose higher duty would have to come from clear, unambiguous language.
Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 12 Sup. Ct. 55 (1891); Hortranft v. Weigmann, 7
Sup. Ct. 1240 (1886); United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 491 (U.S. 1873).
27. United States v. Tam, 15 Ct. Cust. App. 252 (1927).
28. Cf. Meyer v. United States, 124 Fed. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 19011 and Loggie v.
United States, 127 Fed. 813 (1st Cir. 1905).
29. Cf. Wyman v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. App. 241 (1925) and Jackson v.
United States, 2 Ct. Cust. App. 70 (1911) with United States v. Merck & Co., 91 Fed.
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).
30. United States v. Schwarz 140 Fed. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1905); United States v.
Richardson, 13 Ct. Cust. App. 286 (1925).
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and in so pointing to such other designation Congress desired that it should
prevail.3'
It is apparent that the tariff acts contemplate the possibility of new
types of articles being imported, and that they too should be dutiable if
they fall into any class designated in the act. The schedule is not just
an itemized list of all the items of commerce in existence at the date of
enactment. As stated by the court in United States v. L. A. Salomon & Bro.:
It must be remembered that the tariff acts are intended to bring
within the purview of their provisions imported merchandise which
is described therein, notwithstanding the fact that such merchandise,
at the time of the law's enactment, was not known in our
international commerce. It is well established that tariff statutes
arc made for the future as well as for the present.
3 2
However, in determining the proper classification of new articles, the
court, with legislative intent ever its guide, may go beyond the literal
and mechanical wording of the statute and consider the matters of use
and the objective of protection. A new article which fits in a literal
way within a class designation, may escape duty thereunder where its
use is of a different type and it does not compete with the articles
described in the paragraph;33 so to classify it would not serve the legislative
purpose of protection.
III.
Sound and successful business operations involve the prediction of
costs in order to determine whether a proposed transaction is prudent and
whether profit may be realized. For the importer the amount of his
tariff may be a major element in his total costs, and hence the prediction
of his classification may be vital to his practical decision. From the
foregoing it may seem that the uncertainties surrounding classification
are a large obstacle in his way. A priori reasoning from a study of the
tariff schedule would be perilous and unrewarding, and even expert opinion
based on familiarity with classification principles would offer no sure
guaranty. However, means are provided whereby the importer can deter-
mine with absolute certainty the amount of tariff for which he will become
liable. Moreover, to put these problems in proper perspective, it must
be remembered that this discussion concerns rare and exceptional cases;
an extremely small percentage of the total number of liquidations is
protested. Nevertheless, these problems are real ones to the average
importer, as he never can be sure when he may encounter them in a
practical way.
Aside from the matter of absolute assurance, the importer has a
31. Drakenfield & Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Cust. App. 124 (1919).
32. See note 18, sumra; also, United States v. Marshall Field & Co., 18 C.C.P.A.
403 (1931); Klots v. United States, 139 Fed. 606 (2d Cir. 1905); Chicago Mica Co.
v. United States, 21 C.C.P.A. 401 (1934).
33 Gimbel Bros. v. United States, 22 C.C.P.A. 146 (1934).
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number of means of predicting the classification of his proposed import
with a very high degree of probability. He can draw on his own experience
and observation and such expert advice as he may seek. Beyond that be
would find customs officials very helpful and cooperative in informal
conversations, though lie could get no binding commitment from the
government in this way. Moreover, lie can rely on prior government
classifications that have become established practice. This is despite
the fact that the government has a right to change a particular practice
of classification if it subsequently decides this practice was erroneous.34
However, this change cannot come about suddenly or arbitrarily, and
Bureau of Customs regulations afford the importer a high degree of
protection against such a change in an established classification. If such
a change is to result in a higher rate of duty, it can come about only
after instructions from the Bureau, and will apply only to merchandise
imported after ninety days from the date of publication of these instructions
in Treasury Decisions. 5 This regulation does not apply to changes
resulting from court decisions, but that is not necessary, as reports of court
decisions are public and available to the importer. In addition, the
importer may have his classification determined in advance by sending
through a sample or token import of the article in question prior to im-
portation in commercial quantities.
But he is provided with the means of ascertaining absolutely the
amount of his tariff by Bureau of Customs regulations. By sending to
the Commissioner of Customs a full description of the proposed import,
including information as to value, component material, use, and com-
mercial designation, and a sample if possible, he may get a ruling as
to its classification in advance. 30  If there is not already a controlling
Treasury Decision covering the article, the ruling is published as a
Treasury Decision, a copy being sent to the applicant.37  Such a
Treasury Decision becomes a uniform practice, which invests the Com-
missioner's ruling with the stability and safeguards surrounding established
government classifications." The government bears the costs of this
procedure, which may be substantial, especially if complicated samples
must be submitted for analysis. If the importer obtains such a ruling,
it remains for him to ensure that the importation when offered actually
conforms to the description or sample on which the ruling was based in
order to obtain that classification. He should be aware that small
discrepancies in this regard may place him in another classification.
There is other procedural recognition of the peculiar importance
34. Gulbenkian v. United States, 175 Fed. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd 186 Fed.
133 (2d Cir. 1911).
3 U.S. Treas. Reg., Bureau of Customs, § 16.10 (a).
36. Id. at § 16.10a (a).
37. Id. at § 16.10a (b).
38. Id. at 16.10a c .
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of classification problems. Classification cases arising under Section 1516 (b)
of the tariff act"" are accorded a special priority on the dockets of both
the Customs Court40 and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.4t
While all this machinery assists the importer in his classification
problems, it of course cannot hope to eliminate them. The importer
may have cause to complain of the delay and red tape involved in getting
a Bureau ruling. But it may be that this is part of that unavoidable red
tape which must be regarded as necessary cost or overhead for the pro-
tection of individual rights. Undoubtedly in the field of government
there is much unnecessary red tape, but some of it is only seemingly
so, and in the final analysis can be justified in principle as a means of
discriminating and sensitive protection of individual rights. On the side
of the customs officials there is complaint that much of the criticism
concerning classification stems from the importers' failure to avail them-
selves of their opportunities for ascertaining their classifications in advance.
Of course, there are undoubtedly cases where the nature of a business
transaction is such as to leave the importer little time to make his decision,
and the delay involved in ascertaining his classification would be fatal to the
transaction, so that in effect these procedures are unavailable to him.
However, he should accept such situations in good grace as being among
the innumerable instances in any business activity where a decision must
be made quickly without opportunity for mature consideration of all
pertinent factors.
Moreover, the ninety day period42 before a higher rate resulting
from a change in aii established classification practice will take effect
may be far from solving an importer's problems. In some cases heavy
investments may have been made in plant and organization for the purpose
of carrying on an importing business or program in reliance on the then
existing tariff rate and classification. If the classification changes to a
higher rate so as in effect to destroy the venture, ninety days may not be
sufficient time to wind up the operation without incurring serious losses
or to recover a substantial part of the investment. In such cases probably
no paricular waiting period would be especially helpful, but at least this
mitigates the discomfitures resulting from classification changes,
So long as the time-honored and well entrenched tariff system prevails,
classification problems will continue to be an unavoidable hazard of the
importing business. The procedural machinery designed for the importer's
benefit can only hope to mitigate rather than eliminate these problems.
39. Title 19 U.S.C.A. These are cases involving a special procedure whereby the
Secretary of the Treasury upon request furnishes the importer with the classification of
designated merchandise.
40. 62 STAT. 982 (1948) 28 U.S.C. § 2638 (1952).
41. 62 STAT. 980 (1948), 28 U.SC. § 2602 (1952).
42. Until September 6, 1952 (T.D. 53093, 17 FrD. Rae. 8066), the period was
thirty days.
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There are certainly valid criticisms to be made, but when viewed from
the whole perspective, the system of classification procedures appears to be
reasonably designed to assist the average importer and to be available to
him. The procedure for ascertaining classification in advance has been
in effect only since 1950, which is perhaps insufficient time for a body of
precedent and routine practice to develop on which to base a sound
critical appraisal.
The political question as to the wisdom of the protective tariff is
beyond the scope of this discussion. In recognizing this legislative
motivation, the courts carefully refrain from editorial comment on it.
However, it is of interest to note that problems of classification have
as their progenitor the policy of protection. The hairline distinctions made
in the schedule result from a conscientious effort to make the protection
uniform according to the varying degrees of protection sought or required
by the various domestic interests. Thus, as a hypothetical example,
growers of one type of apple may havc demonstrated a need for a 25
percent protection, while growers of a similar but different variety had need
of only 20 percent protection. In fairness to both industry and the con-
sumer, the tariff act seeks to be sensitive to these differences, and in
order to separate the rate for the two types of apples, the statute will
have to distinguish between them through separate and carefully worded
classifications. On the other hand, if the motive for the tariff were
purely revenue, a straight ad valorem duty on all imports indiscriminately
would suffice, and the need for classifications would disappear. Such a
tariff would not need to differentiate locomotives from silk stockings.
